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Introduction
Strengthening fiscal capacity in low- and middle-income countries is essential for
achieving sustainable development (Di John 2006; Brautigam et al. 2008; Besley and
Persson 2011). It enables countries to undertake necessary investments into infrastruc-
ture and national public goods, thereby increasing economic efficiency, while also
strengthening the social contract with their tax-paying citizens, thus mitigating corrup-
tion and increasing political stability (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Di John 2006;
Djankov et al. 2008; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). Consequently, it should come as no
surprise that the international community—in the form of the Sustainable Development
Goals—declared its ambition to strengthen fiscal capacity (SDG 17.1). In 2010, G20
leaders underscored the importance of building tax capabilities, calling for international
financial institutions to ramp up their efforts.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the primary global agent of fiscal policy
reform—has taken a front-stage role in this process. Through its in-house tax research
(e.g., Keen 2009; Cottarelli 2011; Akitoby et al. 2018), the institution disseminates
experience on tax policy reforms across its 189 member countries. For instance, by
providing technical assistance in the form of the Tax Policy Assessment Framework
(TPAF), the IMF supports country efforts to redesign their tax systems. The IMF can
also compel tax policy reforms in its role as a “lender of last resort,” where countries in
economic trouble adopt structural reforms in exchange for emergency loans (Stone
2002). The IMF has used its uniquely powerful position to promote a model of tax
policy that favors broad-based consumption taxes and discourages trade taxes
(Seabrooke 2010; Ban 2015, 2016; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017; Stubbs and
Kentikelenis 2018a).
A sympathetic viewpoint on the IMF’s policy advice is that the organization offers a
hub of expertise on tax issues that helps build the capacity of weak states by conducting
research and disseminating best practices (Tanzi and Zee 2001; Akitoby et al. 2018). In
this role, the IMF has prioritized assistance to developing countries for revenue mobi-
lization through its surveillance, lending, and technical assistance (Cottarelli 2011). Its
fiscal policy experts have advised on measures aimed at raising revenues and establish-
ing more effective tax administrations (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008, 242–43).
For its critics, the IMF promotes “neoliberal policies” that undermine state institu-
tions (Kentikelenis and Babb 2018; Kentikelenis and Babb 2019; Reinsberg et al.
2019a; Reinsberg et al. 2019b). They claim that Fund policy prescriptions—despite
well-advertised modifications in recent years—still have a market-oriented thrust
(Grabel 2011; Güven 2012; Ban and Gallagher 2015), entailing privatization of public
enterprises, imposition of user fees, and a shift away from supposedly “progressive”
forms of taxes toward “regressive” value-added taxes (VAT) (Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
IMF tax advice, they argue, typically follows standard prescriptions that privilege
business interests—notably, the introduction of broad-based VAT with no
exemptions—which may not be the appropriate tax recipe for all countries under all
circumstances (Emran and Stiglitz 2005; Bird and Gendron 2007; Stiglitz 2009;
Stewart 2016).
In light of this debate, we revisit the relationship between IMF programs and tax
revenues using a panel of up to 119 developing countries over the 1993–2013 period.
We use data for four types of tax revenues available from the International Centre for
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Tax and Development (Prichard et al. 2014), along with computer-assisted coding of
text from newly available IMF conditionality data (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). We find
that IMF programs rebalance the composition of tax revenues from trade taxes to goods
and services taxes, but do not increase the overall tax intake. Controlling for non-
random selection and a host of confounders, IMF programs are associated with an
increase in goods and services tax revenue by more than 2% of the GDP in the long
run, but a decrease in trade tax revenue that is smaller in magnitude in most models.
Further analyses show that IMF interventions increase the likelihood of VAT intro-
duction, and that the IMF’s impact on goods and services revenue is greatest when the
IMF explicitly mandates policy measures on this tax.
Our findings contribute to an important debate in development policy. We offer
novel insights for scholars and practitioners focusing on the fiscal impact of economic
reform programs designed by international financial institutions (IFIs). Until now, this
strand of research has primarily focused on the IMF’s impact on public spending (e.g.,
Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Clements et al. 2013; Rickard and Caraway 2018),
paying less attention to its impact on revenues. Although our findings are consistent
with earlier studies on revenues of a more limited scope (Mahon 2004; Crivelli 2013;
Fairfield 2013; Bastiaens and Rudra 2016), we extend this work by offering a more
fine-grained perspective on the impact of IMF programs. In particular, we provide
disaggregated analysis into different tax types and IMF tax policy conditions that
allows us to demonstrate how powerful IFIs like the IMF can shape domestic tax
policies.
Tax Policy and the International Monetary Fund
Social scientists have long scrutinized the macro-historical determinants of tax policy
(Mann 1986; Tilly 1990; Aidt and Jensen 2009; D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017), and—
in more recent years—the role of globalization has received growing attention (Wibbels
and Arce 2003; Dietsch and Rixen 2016; Swank 2016). Among the global determinants
shaping tax policy, the IMF—with its broad membership and unchallenged role as
global lender of last resort—has been among the most influential actors (Babb 2013;
Stone 2002; Woods 2006). The organization offers financial support to countries in
economic trouble in exchange for far-ranging policy reforms, collectively known as
“conditionality.” In relation to taxation, the IMF is interested in raising tax revenues as
a means to stabilize countries in fiscal difficulties, but also seeks to promote private-
sector activity through lower taxes, especially for businesses (Tanzi and Zee 2001; IMF
2017a).
The IMF’s policy advice covers four types of taxes. First, the organization considers
trade taxes to be distortive, especially when they impose uneven customs duties that are
intended to benefit domestic industries, while purportedly harming unorganized groups
like consumers (Tait 1989, p. 7). Eliminating trade taxes is also consistent with the
overall goal of promoting trade liberalization (Woods 2006). Second, the IMF has
advised against more personal income taxes, noting that such taxes distort economic
choices (IMF 2017a, p. 47). In developing countries, income taxes contribute little to
overall tax revenue, given that the number of individuals subject to this tax is small
(Tanzi and Zee 2001). In the IMF’s view, developing countries manage income taxes
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poorly because of too many expense deduction possibilities, especially in the higher
brackets (Tait 1989, p. 6). In recent years, the IMF has come to support progressive
income taxes to improve the distribution of income (IMF 2017a, p. 6), but only in
advanced economies (IMF 2017b, p. 28). Third, the IMF discourages corporate income
taxes due to purported implications on business competitiveness. Its corporate tax
policy advice is geared toward supply-side tax reductions, removal of tax exemptions,
and general rate equalization (Tait 1989, p. 7). For example, in a recent World
Economic Outlook, the IMF applauds Colombia for introducing an “investment-friend-
ly tax reform” (IMF 2017b, p. 17). IMF economists have also advocated unification of
multiple corporate tax rates, which they claim distort economic activities across
different sectors (Tanzi and Zee 2001). Finally, the IMF has long viewed goods and
services taxes—specifically the VAT—as holding significant promise to boost fiscal
revenue. As an indirect tax, the IMF considers the VAT to be an attractive choice for
governments because its implementation is relatively easy compared to income taxes,
and its design makes tax fraud less likely. The benefits of a VAT are said to be best
achieved under a broad base, a low rate applicable to all products, and few exemptions
(Tanzi and Zee 2001). For example, the IMF welcomes the nationwide introduction of
the goods and services tax in India in July 2017, as it “promises unification of India’s
vast domestic market … and [to] push growth above 8 per cent in the medium term”
(IMF 2017b, p. 17).
Unsurprisingly, such far-ranging tax policy advice has significant fiscal ramifica-
tions. Raising consumption taxes can increase fiscal revenues, while reductions to
trade, income, and corporate taxes may have the opposite effect, notwithstanding
improvements to investment and administrative efficiency. As Tanzi and Zee (2001)
write, “[d]eveloping countries will need to reduce sharply their reliance on foreign trade
taxes, without at the same time creating economic disincentives, especially in raising
more revenue from personal income tax.” The IMF thus places a premium on “effi-
cient” taxes, bolstered by its own research for OECD countries showing that the VAT
increases revenues while offsetting revenue losses from other taxes (Keen and
Lockwood 2006). However, the IMF has offered fewer pronouncements on the distri-
butional consequences of efficient taxes. Where discussed, their distributional conse-
quences are understood as potentially adverse, but compensable from the expenditure
side of the fiscal balance with—for example—social safeguards targeted at the most
vulnerable households (Tait 1989; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008; Genschel and Seelkopf
2016).
How can the IMF affect tax policy choices in its member countries? In general,
policy change occurs through three different mechanisms: competition, learning, and
coercion (Dobbin et al. 2007). First, as an organization tasked with reviewing macro-
economic policies of its member states, the IMF promotes dissemination of “best
practices” (Kelley and Simmons 2015). In the context of competitive regulatory
pressures, IMF surveillance accelerates the adoption of “best practices” across
countries—for instance by improving information and thereby amplifying market
pressure toward adoption of market-friendly policies (Lombardi and Woods 2008).
Second, the IMF provides technical assistance at the request of member states, which
accelerates adoption of certain economic policies due to higher exposure to policy ideas
by policymakers (Seabrooke and Nilsson 2015). A number of studies highlight the
importance of technical assistance and spread of ideas through macroeconomic
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research in purveying tax policies (Keen and Lockwood 2010; Mabugu and
Simbanegavi 2015). Third, the IMF exerts greatest leverage over its member countries
when they require IMF assistance—for instance, due to dire economic circumstances—
through conditionality.
While governments still have leeway in implementing conditionality, the IMF
can compel far-reaching policy reform in its member countries because access to
credit is contingent on commitment to such reforms (Vreeland 2007). Hence,
countries should be more likely to adopt IMF-favored tax policy when they need
capital infusions (Swank 2016). Our research design—discussed below—allows
us to test explicitly for the impact of IMF tax conditionality versus other mech-
anisms of IMF influence.
In light of this discussion, we hypothesize that IMF programs—especially those
including tax conditionality—will change the tax structure in developing coun-
tries: those participating in IMF programs will increase VAT revenue but reduce
revenues from trade, corporate, and income taxes. Case-based evidence of such
IMF-induced changes in tax structures is indicative. For example, in 1998, the
government of Rwanda turned to the IMF to access a USD 95 million loan in
exchange for its promise to reform its administration and eventually adopt VAT in
2001 (IMF 1999). In a follow-up program commencing in 2002, the Fund then
called on the government to increase the VAT rate from 15 to 17%, while—at the
same time—mandating a reduction in corporate income tax rates from 40 to 35%
(IMF 2002). While the IMF’s policy advice substituted one type of tax for
another, it failed to engineer a substantive increase in overall tax revenues in
Rwanda (Prichard et al. 2014), as was the underlying motivation. We will test
below whether Rwanda’s experience with IMF-mandated tax reforms holds more
generally in the developing world.
Empirical Evidence on IMF Programs and Tax Revenues
A voluminous body of literature focuses on the impact of IMF programs on the
overall fiscal balance (Bulír and Moon 2004) and, in particular, the spending side
of the budget (Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010; Hamm et al. 2012; Stubbs et al.
2017a; Stubbs et al. 2017b). These studies mostly conclude that participation in
IMF programs improves fiscal outcomes (Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Easterly 2005;
Atoyan and Conway 2006). But only limited research has considered the revenue
side, most of it conducted by IMF staff. Bulír and Moon (2004) study fiscal
outcomes in a short panel of 112 countries in the mid-1990s. They find that
although most countries improved their fiscal balance, they took different strate-
gies depending on their relationship with the Fund. Countries without IMF
programs reduced expenditures but maintained revenue, while countries with
IMF programs reduced both. In the latter countries, conditionality did not have
a significant impact on fiscal positions. Mahon (2004) studied the determinants of
tax reform in Latin America, finding that the IMF catalyzed VAT introduction in
many countries, but that its conditionality had no significant impact among
democracies. Using pooled ordinary least squares on 15 countries over 1977–
1995, his analysis includes two binary variables—an IMF program indicator and a
measure of tax conditionality—which allows for untangling the impact of tax
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conditionality from other aspects of IMF assistance. Studying the 1984–2007
period, Brun et al. (2011) conclude that IMF programs had a negative impact on
total revenues in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, IMF programs increased tax
revenue when countries had high levels of institutional quality, as measured by
bureaucratic quality and the absence of corruption. This is consistent with Bird
and Gendron (2007, p. 181), who argue that “unfortunately, many countries—
including most in sub-Saharan Africa—began their ‘modern’ tax systems with an
unpromising legacy of state-private relations, with almost no trained officials, and
in a very difficult political and economic setting.” Keen and Lockwood (2010)
corroborate the pessimistic picture for sub-Saharan Africa, establishing that IMF
program participation boosts tax revenue only outside that world region.
Scholars argue that in many countries, the demise of trade taxes following trade
liberalization—a strategy pursued by governments often at the behest of the IFIs—
has not been matched by equivalent increases in goods and services taxes
(Mansour and Keen 2009; Keen and Lockwood 2010; Bastiaens and Rudra
2016; Genschel and Seelkopf 2016). To test this possibility, Bastiaens and
Rudra (2016) regress three types of non-trade tax revenue on trade tax revenue
(as proxy for trade liberalization), IFI assistance for tax systems, and an interac-
tion effect for different regime types. In a sample of developing countries from
1990 to 2009, they find evidence for a positive impact of IFI assistance on
domestic taxes in non-democracies after trade liberalization. Their research design
differs from ours in two key aspects. First, motivated by their specific research
question, they treat trade taxes as exogenous, thus neglecting the possibility that
IFI assistance itself can modify such tax revenue. Another potential problem is
that IFI assistance is unlikely to be exogenous. Second, their measure of IFI
assistance is not comparable to the one used in other studies (including ours)
because it uses technical assistance rather than lending, while also neglecting
policy conditions, which is a possible source of omitted variable bias.
While these studies have improved our understanding of the links between IMF
programs and tax revenues, they suffer from several drawbacks. First, many
studies have limited regional scope, typically focusing on a particular region, for
example, post-Soviet economies (Crivelli 2013), Latin America (Mahon 2004;
Fairfield 2013), or OECD countries (Keen and Lockwood 2006). Second, studies
face methodological challenges relating to short panels, pooling of observations,
endogeneity bias, and use of non-transparent system-GMM estimation. A recent
IMF staff paper, examining the determinants of 55 episodes of sustained tax
increases, selects on positive cases only, thus limiting its inference (Akitoby
et al. 2018). Third, studies generally do not spend sufficient efforts to capture
heterogeneity within IMF programs. While some studies consider variation within
IMF programs due to specific types of conditionality (Mahon 2004), they lack
systematic analysis of the implications of tax conditionality on tax structures.
Finally, as most studies are authored by IMF staff, our study provides an external
view on the issues at hand. Indeed, Clist (2016) reports doubtful methodological
choices, poor data quality, and lack of documentation, which prevented successful
replication of published research on tax revenues. Similar criticisms have also
been leveled against IMF studies covering the expenditure side of the fiscal
balance (Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018b).
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Data and Methods
Tax Data
For our empirical analysis, we exploit newly available datasets on tax revenue, tax
adoption, and IMF conditionality. Our sample includes non-high-income countries,
tantamount to GDP per capita below 12,736 US$ according to the World Bank
definition, observed from 1993 to 2013. The choice of sample period primarily reflects
concerns with data availability. In particular, tax data disaggregated by different taxes
are available for more than 100 countries only for this time period. It also avoids the
structural break due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, thus ensuring measurement
equivalence over a twenty-year horizon (Keen and Lockwood 2010).
Tax data comes from the Global Revenue Dataset (GRD) collected by the Interna-
tional Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). The ICTD GRD data combine several
sources to generate extensive time-series cross-section revenue data (Prichard et al.
2014). We use the following variables from the ICTD GRD data as dependent
variables: total tax revenue, goods and services tax revenue, (personal) income tax
revenue, and corporate (income) tax revenue. In the multivariate analysis, all variables
are expressed as percentage of GDP.1
Using the tax revenue data, we first assess graphically the effect of IMF programs on
the composition of tax revenue (Fig. 1). We split the sample into two groups: countries
that never had an IMF program (left panel) and countries that had at least one IMF
program (right panel). The evolution of tax structures differs markedly across the two
groups. Since the end of the Cold War, countries under IMF exposure increased the
share of revenues from goods and services tax relative to trade tax. No clear pattern
emerges for countries without IMF programs. Moreover, there is no apparent difference
in the evolution of relative revenues between both groups for corporate taxes and
income taxes. Overall, the patterns provide a first indication that IMF exposure leads
countries to adjust the relative importance of different tax types.
Conditionality Data
To scrutinize the impact of specific tax policy conditions, we use a new dataset on
conditionality agreed between the Fund and its borrowing countries over more than
three decades (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). As this database includes the text of policy
conditions, we are able to identify conditions related to taxation using computer-
assisted text matching. We construct several indicators. First, any tax condition covers
all tax-related conditions, which include measures related to tax revenues, tax structure,
and capacity building of tax administrations. About one fourth of IMF programs
include at least one such condition. Second, we further distinguish two types of tax
conditionality, specifically on goods and services, and trade, respectively. We do not
1 While some researchers use log-transformed tax revenues as dependent variable (Clist and Morrissey 2011;
Morrissey et al. 2014; Morrissey and Torrance 2015), we follow others using untransformed tax revenues for
ease of interpretation (Besley and Persson 2008; Baunsgaard and Keen 2010; Cárdenas and Tuzemen 2011;
Crivelli 2013; Prichard 2014). Log-transformation is not necessary in our case because diagnostic plots do not
indicate problems with skewness in the revenue variables. Regardless, our results are not sensitive to this
transformation.
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attempt to further analyze the content of these conditions to avoid introducing coding
bias. Reforms require specific taxes to be altered in specific ways, for example,
introducing a tax, altering its modalities, or abolishing it. For country–year-level
analysis, we create a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of a given tax
condition. This discards information on the number of conditions but does not assume
that each tax condition is equally important. Tax conditions are rather rare, so a
dichotomous measure is more robust than a continuous one.2 The supplemental
appendix details the coding procedure for these measures.
Based on the IMF conditionality dataset, we graphically trace the evolution of tax
conditionality (Fig. 2). Its inclusion in IMF programs spread rapidly—from near zero in
1980 to 40% in 1989. The incidence of tax conditionality peaked in 2000, when it was
included in about 75% of IMF programs. Such conditions have remained common
since, although the nature of tax conditionality has shifted away from specific taxes
toward more comprehensive reforms in tax systems and administration.
Control Variables
We include a number of time-varying control variables from the literature on taxation
(Aidt and Jensen 2009; Baunsgaard and Keen 2010; Clist and Morrissey 2011; Prichard
2016). Most of these variables capture the tax base of a country. For example, we
include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita because richer countries have more
taxable income and are better able to collect taxes from their citizens (Scheve and
Stasavage 2010; Clist and Morrissey 2011; Morrissey and Torrance 2015). We also
include non-tax revenue (as a percentage of GDP)—available from the ICTD GRD
Fig. 1 Evolution of tax revenues by IMF exposure. Data sources: IMF conditionality database (Kentikelenis
et al. 2016) and ICTD GRD tax data (Prichard et al. 2014). Based on 110 IMF program countries and 31 non-
IMF program countries
2 We do not separate binding conditions from non-binding conditions because the low frequency of tax
conditions would prevent model convergence.
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data—to capture the lower revenue requirements in countries with alternative income
sources (Prichard 2014). Trade openness (as a percentage of GDP) is included because
trade taxes are relatively easy to collect (Clist and Morrissey 2011). In contrast, tax
collection from the agricultural sector is difficult in developing countries because
agriculture is primarily a subsistence activity, so we include agricultural output as a
percentage of GDP. Finally, we include the percentage rate of GDP growth, expecting a
positive relationship since booms in the business cycle should facilitate tax revenue
generation (Prichard 2014). Unless otherwise stated, we source all control variables
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). We also include country-
fixed effects that capture time-invariant determinants of tax revenue such as history of
warfare, years of democratic experience, income inequality, and natural resource
endowments (Besley and Persson 2011; Cárdenas and Tuzemen 2011; Morrissey and
Torrance 2015). In addition, we include year-fixed effects to capture global factors that
affect tax revenues equally in all countries. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all
variables in our main analysis.3
Model Specification
We use a statistical model (ad hoc) to test the relationship between IMF interventions
and the structure of taxation in developing countries. Following recent advice, we
proceed with a general model and test restrictions to identify the appropriate statistical
model (Keele and Kelly 2006; De Boef and Keele 2008; Beck and Katz 2011). In
particular, our models include a lagged dependent variable, which is warranted theo-
retically because governments often target revenues based on realized revenue of the
previous fiscal year. The econometric rationale for including the lagged dependent
Fig. 2 The use of tax conditionality in IMF programs over time.Data sources: Own coding based on the IMF
conditionality database (Kentikelenis et al. 2016)
3 Table A1 in the Supplemental Appendix shows detailed data sources.
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variable is to mitigate serial error correlation beyond the computation of clustered
standard errors (Beck and Katz 2011). Following our theoretical interest to establish
short-term effects of IMF conditions on tax revenues, we include explanatory variables
with lags respectively from one year up to three years.4
Another important issue pertains to the simultaneity of different kinds of tax
revenues. Governments may conceive different tax types as potential substitutes toward
meeting a fixed total revenue target. Tax policy choices thus are likely to be interde-
pendent. We account for this by estimating seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR),
which first estimates all constitutive equations individually before imposing a joint
error structure across all equations (Roodman 2012).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of main variables
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Total tax revenue 2506 14.6 6.9 0.3 62.8
Goods and services tax revenue 2201 6.4 4.1 0.0 29.1
Trade tax revenue 2204 3.5 4.0 0.0 42.1
Income tax revenue 2122 4.4 2.8 0.0 17.1
Corporate tax revenue 1570 2.3 1.7 0.0 11.5
IMF program 2882 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
Any tax condition 2882 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0
Goods and services tax condition 2882 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0
Trade tax condition 2882 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Log(GDP per capita) 2730 7.2 1.1 4.2 9.6
Total non-tax revenue 2404 6.2 8.3 − 24.4 71.7
Trade openness 2630 81.1 39.0 0.0 321.6
Agricultural output 2568 20.1 13.4 1.9 65.9
GDP growth 2745 4.1 6.6 − 62.1 106.3
Past programs 2961 2.4 2.5 0.0 6.0
Countries under programs 2961 62.0 8.6 41.0 75.0
UNGA vote alignment 2704 0.6 0.1 0.3 1.0
Reserves 2159 4.6 4.7 0.0 79.2
External balance 2630 − 11.3 20.8 − 184.7 45.3
Debt service 2388 4.5 5.7 0.0 135.4
Freedom House index 2811 6.0 3.6 0.0 12.0
Executive election 2437 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
Country office 2961 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Regional office 2961 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the sample period used in the main analysis (1993–2013)
4 We are aware that inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the presence of fixed effects produces biased
estimates (Nickell 1981)—even though the bias is concentrated in the lagged dependent variable coefficient. In
our multiple-equation setup, we cannot use the bias-corrected Anderson-Hsiao estimator for unbalanced
dynamic panel data (Bruno 2005). Nonetheless, in regressions for individual tax revenues, we verified that
all coefficients are similar compared to a conventional (biased) estimator.
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A well-known inferential challenge is non-random assignment of countries to IMF
programs (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). For instance, countries with low revenue
may need to request IMF credit, thereby introducing a reverse causality problem. We
therefore add a selection equation to the above SUR system, deploying well-established
instruments to predict IMF program participation. Our main instrument is the UNGA
Vote Alignment (Bailey et al. 2015) between the borrower and the G7 countries. The
instrument is relevant because allies of big powers receive favorable treatment by IFIs
(Thacker 1999; Bas and Stone 2014; Dreher et al. 2015); it is excludable because
geopolitical alignment is unrelated to tax revenues conditional on control variables
(such as level of development) and time-invariant country characteristics. Further
improving the predictive power of our selection model, we include past programs, a
count variable for the prior years of IMF exposure over a five-year horizon, previously
found to reliably predict current participation (Moser and Sturm 2011). Program
participation is also affected by the extent to which the Fund has resources available,
which depends on the current number of program countries (Vreeland 2003). Hence,
we include the contemporaneous count variable countries under programs. Additional
variables capture macroeconomic conditions—logged GDP per capita, GDP growth,
reserves in months of imports, EXTERNAL BALANCE (as percentage of GDP), and debt
service (as percentage of GNI)—as well as political characteristics—democracy as
measured by the (rescaled) Freedom House index combining political rights and civil
liberties and Executive elections—that have been previously found to affect program
participation.5 We also include regional dummies and year dummies.
Another challenge is that tax conditionality within IMF program countries may not
be randomly assigned. For example, countries with low revenue may be particularly
likely to obtain such conditions.6 We remedy this challenge by estimating an additional
selection model for tax conditionality, although this time no instruments are readily
available from previous literature. Our preferred instrument is a time-varying dummy
variable of country eligibility for technical assistance under the regional training centers
jointly managed by the Fund and its borrowers. For example, the Vienna Joint Institute
is the oldest of these centers, established in 1992, while the Africa Training Institute is
the most recent one, starting operations in 2013. The centers provide advice on tax
administration, fiscal issues, and monetary policy. This instrument is relevant because
IMF staff should be more likely to assign tax conditionality if the country would be
eligible to benefit from related technical advice to implement it—given that the IMF
staff are interested in the success of their programs. In the absence of a regional center,
the country might not have the capacity to properly implement tax reform, even if
facing a condition to do so. While our instrument may not be entirely excludable with
respect to tax revenue—tax-related technical assistance might help directly raise tax
revenues—we note that we use eligibility for such assistance, not whether assistance
was provided, which attenuates this problem. The remaining bias likely overestimates
our results, given that we expect tax-related technical assistance to increase tax
5 These variables are all lagged one period further than the lag of IMF program.
6 To examine this issue further, we attempted to predict tax conditionality using tax revenue and a range of
standard controls as explanatory variables, finding such conditions have similar determinants as IMF programs
more generally—such as national income, economic growth, and foreign reserves—as well as lagged tax
revenue (p < 0.1). This suggests that there is some degree of reverse causality: countries receive tax conditions
due to poor revenue performance.
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revenues. We thus consider this approach a useful point of departure. To increase the
predictive fit, we add dummies for whether a country is under an IMF program (as a
necessary condition for tax conditionality), whether a country hosts an IMF Resident
Representative Office (Mayer and Mourmouras 2008, p. 118),7 control variables from
the outcome stage capturing the structure of the economy, and year dummies.
Together with the outcome equations, the two selection equations are part of a multi-
equation system with four linear equations for the respective kinds of tax revenues and
two probit-type equations for IMF programs and tax conditionality, which can be
consistently estimated through maximum likelihood assuming a joint multivariate
normal error distribution (Roodman 2012). Country-clustered standard errors are
computed to take temporal dependence of the within-country observations into account.
Findings
We expect that IMF programs alter the tax structure of borrowing countries. Using
multivariate analysis, we corroborate this argument below by showing that IMF
interventions increase revenue from goods and services tax while decreasing revenue
from other types of tax.8
Overall effect of IMF programs on tax revenues
Table 2 shows coefficient estimates of IMF programs with respect to the different tax
revenues across a three-year time horizon. Overall, IMF programs are positively related
to an increase in goods and service tax revenue by 0.7% of GDP (p < 0.01) after one
year. In substantive terms, this effect is around one tenth of the standard deviation of
goods and services tax revenue. Given the dynamic model specification, the long-term
effect of IMF intervention is even greater, at more than 2% of GDP.9 Effect magnitudes
are smaller for subsequent lags and statistically significant only for the third lag. We do
not find significant effects of IMF programs on other tax revenues.
Using Wald tests (presented in Appendix Table B1), we compare coefficients across
types of tax revenue. We find that the once-lagged positively significant IMF program
coefficient in goods and services tax revenue is significantly greater than its counter-
parts in all other tax revenues, except for income tax. The same result holds for the
7 If the IMF operates a country office, it is thought to be better able to help countries build support for sound
policies, and IMF resident representatives are well-placed to assist through seminars, meetings with parlia-
mentarians, interest groups, and the media (Mayer and Mourmouras 2008, p. 118). As the Fund is interested in
conditions being implemented, and tax reforms require a sustained effort to do so, then it may make sense to
assign tax conditions in those countries that have a country office.
8 In the supplemental appendix, we examine the determinants of the introduction of specific taxes, notably the
VAT, as a necessary condition for related revenue increases. Using data from the Tax Introduction Database
(Seelkopf and Lierse 2014), we find that countries that were under at least one IMF program over the past
three decades have a much faster rate of adoption compared to non-IMF borrowers, while the adoption rate for
other tax types is not significantly different across these two groups (Figure D1). Bivariate probit regressions
show that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of VAT adoption until three years into an IMF
program (Table D1).
9 The long-term effect can be computed as β/(1 −α) = 2.03, where α is the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable and β the short-term coefficient. We use the bias-corrected estimate (α = 0.7).
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second-lagged IMF program coefficient. Two significant differences remain: the dif-
ference in once-lagged coefficients in trade tax revenue and income tax revenue, and
the difference in third-lagged coefficients in corporate tax revenue and income tax
revenue. Wald tests can also determine whether IMF assistance succeeds in recouping
lost revenue from certain tax types by other tax types (Appendix Table B2). To that
end, we test whether the sum of any two coefficients is different from zero, finding that
the IMF-induced growth in goods and service tax revenue over-compensates for the
loss in trade tax revenue. We find no significant compensation effects for other
combinations of tax revenues.
Table 2 also includes coefficients of all control variables and the selection
equation. Control variables typically do not reach standard thresholds of statistical
significance but, where they do, exhibit their expected effect direction. For
example, richer countries are relatively more reliant on personal income taxes.
Overall, our models explain around 70% of the within-country variation, indicat-
ing that they feature important variables capturing the relevant tax bases. Turning
to the selection model, we corroborate the pertinent results of previous research
establishing the importance of borrower recidivism, economic fundamentals, and
geopolitical factors. Highly significant economic predictors of IMF programs
include per-capita income, GDP growth, foreign reserves, and debt service. More-
over, we find evidence that countries voting in line with the major powers in the
UN General Assembly are more likely to obtain IMF loans, while domestic
politics (specifically the Freedom House index and executive elections) are not
statistically significant.
The Effect of Tax Conditionality on Tax Revenues
We now assess the impact of specific types of tax conditions. Table 3 proceeds with a
test of whether any kind of tax conditionality affects tax revenues within a three-year
horizon. Results indicate that tax conditionality is positively related to goods and
services tax revenue in the first year. Among all IMF programs, goods and services
tax revenue is higher by about 0.81% of GDP for those with tax conditionality than
those without it (p < 0.05). Since our estimations include a lagged dependent variable,
the cumulative effect of this instantaneous increase is 3.24% of GDP, or 80% of a
standard deviation in tax revenue. The coefficient of IMF programs remains positive
but becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting that tax conditionality drives the
change in tax revenue. In the second year, however, tax conditionality exerts a weakly
negative effective on goods and services tax revenue (p < 0.1), while other aspects of
the program exert no effect. In the third year, both tax conditionality and other aspects
of IMF programs significantly increase goods and services tax revenue, although both
effects are smaller than before and less precisely estimated.
Next, we find that tax conditionality significantly reduces trade tax revenue by
0.93% of GDP after one year (p < 0.01), which translates into a cumulative effect of
2.79% of GDP, representing more than 70% of a standard deviation of trade tax
revenue. This negative effect is somewhat mitigated by a positively significant IMF
program effect of about 0.54% of GDP (p < 0.05), or 1.61% of GDP in cumulative
terms. This effect may be related to the receipt of fresh loans, technical assistance, or
signaling effects.
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Turning to the remaining types of tax revenues, we find that tax conditionality is
associated with increased corporate tax revenue after two years (p < 0.01), but the
overall effect of IMF intervention is negative, given the substantially larger point
estimate for residual aspects of IMF programs (p < 0.01). We also obtain a significantly
negative effect of IMF programs on income tax revenue after two years, although tax
conditionality tends to reverse this effect after three years (p < 0.1). The negative
coefficients of the IMF program dummy—diverging from the coefficients of tax
conditionality—are entirely plausible as they may indicate the adverse revenue impli-
cations of market-liberalizing policy reforms that are often attached to IMF lending
programs.
We now compare coefficients on tax conditionality across equations using Wald
tests (presented in Appendix Table B3). Considering just the differences in once-lagged
coefficients, we find that the effect of any tax condition is significantly larger in goods
and services tax revenues than in all other tax revenues, while being significantly
smaller in trade tax revenue compared to all remaining tax revenues, at least at the 5%
level. Conversely, none of the IMF program coefficient differences for the first lag are
significant across equations. Findings for subsequent lags are less consistent, suggest-
ing that the divergence in tax revenue types due to tax conditionality is strongest in the
first year.
Our coding protocol further allows us to identify tax conditions that only pertain to
specific types of tax revenues. Table 4 relates two specific types of tax revenue to the
two respective types of tax conditions, notably for goods and services taxes, and trade
taxes.10 We find that conditionality related to goods and services taxes—notably VAT
measures—robustly increases the associated tax revenue in the first year. Substantively,
such conditions increase VAT revenue instantaneously by 1.07% of GDP, and 4.29%
of GDP in the long term (p < 0.01). Residual aspects of IMF programs exert weakly
positive effects. The reverse image emerges for trade tax conditionality. Trade tax-
related conditionality reduces trade tax revenue by at most 0.97% of GDP in the first
year, or 2.89% of GDP in the long term (p < 0.01). Effects in subsequent years remain
statistically significant but are somewhat smaller.
In sum, to the extent that our research design lends itself to causal interpretation of
coefficient estimates, our results show that IMF tax conditionality has played an
essential role in trimming trade taxes and boosting goods and services tax revenue,
while helping secure increases in corporate tax and income tax revenues (Table 5).
Robustness Checks
We probe the robustness of our main findings in the supplemental appendix. First, we
verify that our results hold under an alternative instrument for tax conditionality
(Table C1). To predict tax conditionality in a given program, we use the number of
IMF programs in the same region with tax conditionality in the same year. This
instrument is relevant to the degree that it picks up fads in IMF program design, such
as the design of tax conditionality (Stubbs et al. 2020). More importantly, the instru-
ment is plausibly excludable because tax conditionality in other programs is unlikely to
10 There are not enough observations on corporate tax and income tax for our structural estimations to
converge with the respective tax conditionalities.
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affect tax revenues in a given country, except through the diffusion of such condition-
ality. Using this alternative instrument, we find that tax conditionality robustly in-
creases goods and services tax revenue but reduces trade tax revenue in the first year
(p < 0.01).11
Second, another strategy to remedy potential endogeneity is to use internal instru-
ments and estimate system GMM regressions (Roodman 2009). This approach is often
considered to be problematic—as it lacks transparency and rests on assumptions that
are unlikely to hold in the context of IMF program effects research (Stubbs et al.
2020)—but it is useful when external instruments for tax conditionality are hard to find.
We estimate a system GMM model with a once-lagged IMF program indicator,
instrumented by second lags of all variables from the selection model in the differences
equation and first difference of these variables in the levels equation. When we split
programs into those with tax conditionality and those without—assuming they can be
both instrumented with the same variables—we find that IMF programs with tax
conditionality increase revenue from goods and services taxes but exert no effect on
other revenue types (Table C2). Overall, this analysis is consistent with our findings.
Finally, albeit not our main focus of analysis, we also scrutinize an extended sample
period. While data are available for the 1980–2013 period, we preferred the 1993–2013
Table 4 Tax revenues and IMF tax conditionality on specific tax types (1993–2013)
Goods and services tax
revenue
Trade tax revenue
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3
Tax conditionality 1.072*** 0.220 0.236 − 0.965** − 0.691* − 0.761**
(0.338) (0.161) (0.162) (0.426) (0.407) (0.375)
IMF program 0.521* 0.336* 0.435** 0.181 0.122 0.085
(0.284) (0.178) (0.220) (0.126) (0.137) (0.107)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection equation for IMF program Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection equation for tax conditionality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1849 1807 1763 1844 1808 1769
Within-R2 0.727 0.738 0.734 0.527 0.527 0.526
Pseudo-R2 (IMF program) 0.361 0.357 0.353 0.361 0.357 0.353
Pseudo-R2 (Tax conditionality) 0.450 0.440 0.430 0.450 0.440 0.430
Notes: Tax conditionality refers to any tax condition specifically on the revenue type shown in the column
header. Dependent variables are tax revenues (% GDP) for the indicated tax type in the outcome equation. In a
given panel—corresponding to a specific type of revenue—equations are jointly estimated in a seemingly
unrelated regression framework. Tax equations include two-way fixed effects, control variables, and the
lagged dependent variable. The equation for IMF program selection includes regional dummies and year
dummies. The tax conditionality equation uses country office, regional office, IMF program, and control
variables from the outcome equation as predictors. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
Significance levels: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
11 We limit the presentation of our findings to the first lag of the effect due to space constraints. Results for
later lags are similar to the main results.
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period for consistency with previous research (Crivelli and Gupta 2016). And yet, the
main results are robust in the 1980–2013 period. Considering the aggregate effect of
IMF programs on tax revenues (Table C3), we find an even stronger positive relation-
ship between IMF programs and goods and service tax revenues (p < 0.01); an
Table 5 Overview of main results
Dependent
variable(s)
Key
predictor(s)
Correction for endogeneity Main finding Source
Tax revenues
• Goods and
services
• Trade
• Corporate
income
• Personal
income
IMF program Selection model for IMF
program (using UN General
Assembly vote alignment as
exogenous predictor)
IMF program increases goods
and services tax revenues
(p < 0.01) except after
2 years
Table 2
• Any tax
condition-
ality
• IMF
program
(capturing
residual
aspects)
• Selection model for IMF
program (as above)
• Selection model for any tax
conditionality (using
existence of IMF regional
center as exogenous
predictor
As before but
• Alternative instrument using
number of programs with
tax conditionality in the
region
• Any tax conditionality
increases goods and
services tax revenues in first
year (p < 0.05) and third
year (p < 0.1) but reduces in
second year (p < 0.1);
reduces trade tax revenue in
first year (p < 0.01);
increases corporate tax
revenue in second year
(p < 0.01) and income tax
revenue in third year
(p < 0.1)
• Residual effect of IMF
intervention positive for
goods and services tax
(p < 0.1) and trade tax
(p < 0.05) but negative for
corporate tax and income
tax (p < 0.01)
Any tax conditionality now
unrelated to income tax
revenue; reduces trade tax
revenue also in third year
(p < 0.05); no effect on
goods and services tax in
third year
Table 3
Table C1
• Tax
condition-
ality on
goods and
services tax
• Tax
condition-
ality on
trade tax
• Selection model for IMF
program (as above)
• Selection model for any tax
conditionality (using
existence of IMF regional
center as exogenous
predictor)
• Tax conditionality on goods
and services tax increases
goods and services tax
revenue in first year
(p < 0.01), with positive
residual effect of IMF
intervention throughout
(p < 0.1)
• Tax conditionality on trade
tax decreases trade tax
revenue throughout
(p < 0.05, except p < 0.1 in
second year); no residual
effect of IMF program
Table 4
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insignificant relationship between IMF programs and trade tax revenue; and a positive
relationship between IMF programs and income tax revenue. Considering tax condi-
tions and respective types of tax revenue (Table C4), we find a positively robust (short-
term) effect of tax conditionality on goods and services tax revenue, as well as a
negatively robust effect of tax conditionality on trade tax revenue. This again demon-
strates that tax conditionality has effectively altered tax structures in developing
countries over the past 35 years.
Conclusion
In recent years, IFIs have declared the strengthening of fiscal capacity of developing
countries to be a key priority (IMF 2016). Yet, the IMF is not impartial in its tax policy
advice. The VAT, applied with a broad base, uniform rates, and no exemptions, is
favored, while trade taxes and taxes with distortive effects are discouraged. We
hypothesized that IMF tax policy preferences alter the composition of tax revenues in
developing countries, particularly when these countries are susceptible to IMF policy
pressure via conditional lending programs. Indeed, we found that the average program
is associated with increases in goods and services tax revenue and decreases in trade tax
revenue. We also found that tax conditions attached to these programs matter for
delivering the aforementioned changes to tax systems. Tax conditionality has less
consistent effects on other tax revenues, though these effects tend to be positive. Our
main result thus is that IMF tax conditionality alters the composition of tax revenues,
holding across different specifications of selection models, estimation methods, and
sample periods.
Our findings contribute to political economy research examining the role of IFIs in
national economic policy-making. In particular, although earlier findings of IMF-
induced under-recovery of lost trade tax revenue are not disputed (Seelkopf, Lierse,
and Schmitt 2016), these rest on specific model choices. Our SUR analysis, which
considers all relevant tax types as jointly determined, fails to provide robust evidence
for under-recovery, but rather suggests that the loss in trade tax revenue is compensated
by VAT revenue. As a result, IMF tax conditionality serves to alter the structure of
taxation in developing countries.
The structure of taxation has important socio-economic implications for borrowing
countries, and the IMF’s emphasis on the introduction of VAT and maximization of its
revenues can be controversial. To be sure, many economists argue that the VAT is
well-designed to implement fundamental principles of optimal taxation theory: there
should be no taxation of capital, no taxation of intermediary goods, and low top rates
for income taxes (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971; Mankiw et al. 2009; Mirrlees 2011). By
averting distortion of production decisions, the VAT is said to maximize economic
efficiency. Meanwhile, the objective of redistribution, according to optimal taxation
theory, is best pursued through other mechanisms such as lump-sum transfers. How-
ever, development economists point out that while a tax system with heavy reliance on
VAT may be optimal for advanced economies, it is inappropriate for many developing
countries (Emran and Stiglitz 2005; Bird and Gendron 2007; Stewart 2016). First, it
may have adverse distributive impact, as the set of instruments for redistribution is
more limited in developing countries. Second, it may be less conducive to economic
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efficiency, because the presence of a non-taxable informal sector distorts allocation
decisions. Indeed, when a large part of the economy is informal, the VAT is not applied
universally, but a trade tax may be. Third, the VAT is less corruption-resistant given
that record-keeping systems are not well-advanced in developing countries (Stiglitz
2009). Future research can explore these issues.
Our findings open several further avenues for subsequent work. For one, we
encourage analysis of country heterogeneity in the relationship between IMF tax
conditionality and tax revenues. For instance, our current research design does not
allow for explicit tests of whether capacity affects the efficacy of tax policy advice.
Another important task for future research is to assess the welfare implications of IMF-
induced changes to the tax structure. In principle, countries may expect welfare gains to
the extent that they adopt more efficient taxes—such as the VAT—even though such
taxes may be regressive and thus increase the need for redistribute measures (Bräutigam
2008; Stiglitz 2009; Genschel and Seelkopf 2016). Future analysis thus must simulta-
neously examine the efficiency and equity effects of different taxes. In doing so, it
needs to consider short-term effects and long-term effects, while at the same time
finding convincing solutions to the challenge of endogeneity, for instance due to
reverse causality.
Although our analysis focuses on the 1993–2013 period, its conclusions are timely.
In recent years, the IMF has begun to consider the equity implications of its interven-
tions. Prominent figures in the institution assert that the IMF has shifted away from
“Washington Consensus”-style policies (Ostry et al. 2016). In relation to tax policy, its
Tax Policy Assessment Framework (TPAF) now entails a more balanced assessment of
the VAT, noting that it is a relatively efficient revenue-raising instrument but that it is
also perceived to be regressive. Despite such rhetorical concessions, several studies
suggest that IMF practices have hardly changed (Gabor 2010; Güven 2012; Vernengo
and Ford 2014; Kentikelenis et al. 2016), and that they continue to have a negative
impact on inequality (Forster et al. 2019). A glance at a recent edition of the Fiscal
Monitor confirms that the IMF’s current tax policy advice is consistent with its
traditional emphasis on austerity: it calls for “growth-friendly fiscal policies,” such as
“improving the design of tax policies [to help] remove the distortions that are holding
more productive firms back” (IMF 2017a). To meet the SDG target for strengthening
fiscal capacity and to avoid inequality-increasing forms of taxation, the IMF needs to
reconsider the appropriateness of its tax policy advice toward developing countries.
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